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Abstract
Thailand and the Philippines face similar
security issues, including separatist violence
in their southern provinces. However, the
developmental paths of the two countries
and the governments’ reactions to the minority ethno-religious separatist movements,
the Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the
Philippines, have varied greatly. In Thailand, the government’s desire to create a
singular national identity from mixed ethnic
and religious backgrounds has created periods of forced assimilation tempered by attempts at conciliation. Conversely, the Philippines continued colonial policies of economic and political oppression of the Moro
but created the institutions necessary for
social pluralism. The differing policies of
the Thai and Filipino governments have
shaped the orientation of the separatist
movements within the countries. Currently,
the size and power of the MILF in the Philippines has forced the government to attempt peace talks with the group. However,
in Thailand the reclusive nature of the
BRN‑C remains hinders communications
with the Thai government. This paper demonstrates that the actions taken by the governments of Thailand and the Philippines
have fostered current separatist and terrorist
movements. Addressing these problems will
require state policies that reflect pluralism

and institutions that support social aspirations.
Glossary
ARMM – Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao
Berastu – Unity, separatist group in Thailand
BNPP - Barisan Nasional Pembebasan
Patani
BRN – Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National
Revolutionary Front)
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines
CPT – Communist Party of Thailand
Malay – ethnic minority group in Thailand
MIM – Moro Islamic Movement formerly
the Moro Independence Movement
THE MNLF - Moro National Liberation
Front
MILF - Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Moro - ethnic minority group in the Philippines
OIC – Organization of the Islamic Conference
PAO - Provincial Administrative Organizations (Thailand)
PULO - Patani United Liberation Organization
SBPAC – Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre
SPCPD – Southern Philippines Council for
Peace and Development
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Education

Thailand
Regulation of curriculum
in punohs

Reaction from government

Forced assimilation
Relied on military rather
than political action to
deal with violence

Separatist groups

Size of groups

Focus of groups/ conflict

Class issues

Regional affect
Outside funding

Organization of separatist group

Religious demographics
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BRN and BRN-C
Goals murky at best,
leaders hide in countryside
Exact numbers unknown,
estimated at times as low
as 300 to 500 active
members
Focus of group unknown.
The conflict is both religiously and ethnically
based
Low overall country output/wages until industrial
revolution in late 1980s
Malay have appealed to
Malaysian government
for aid in crisis
Some claim Jamaa
Islamiya connection to
the BRN but the BRN
and scholars deny these
claims
Top down structure in
the BRN-C, with a military and political wing
94% Buddhist
5% Muslim
<1% Christian,
Hindu, Sikh, or Jewish
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Philippines
Secularization of schools

Peace agreements and
ceasefires
Direct political action
MNLF and MILF
Well known leaders and
goals
At peak 30,000 estimated
members

MILF aimed for a
broader political goal
based on the ethnic/
religious identity of the
Moro
Government reallocation
of ancestral Moro land to
Christians
(cycle of poverty)
Connection with Muslim
community in Sabah and
Borneo
Malaysian government
(weapons, transport, etc.)
Aid from Libya under
Kadaffi
Loosely knit with some
infrastructure including a
central committee and
the BMA (Bangsa Moro
Army)
90% Christian
5% Muslim
<1% Buddhist,
Sikh, or animist
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Introduction
Thailand and the Philippines
are currently experiencing similar security concerns, including separatist
violence in their southern provinces.
The violence stems from minority ethno‑religious groups, namely the Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the Philippines. Despite largely similar histories, the developmental paths of the separatist movements
and governmental responses of the two
countries have greatly affected their reactions and level of success with the separatist
movements. The focus in Thailand on identity issues, and the government’s inability to
create lasting and stable institutions through
which to mediate identity issues, has left the
Malay with few official avenues through
which to express their problems. Due to this,
some Malay have begun to work outside of
the system in separatist groups. However, in
the Philippines the government’s economic
oppression has been tempered by a political
readiness to mitigate societal issues. That
has enabled separatist groups to be open
about their leadership and aims, which has
lead to negotiations and attempted peace
treaties with the government.
History before the Modern States
The creation of Thailand and the
Philippines as unified states only occurred in
the early twentieth century. Prior to this,
Thailand was a series of provinces ruled by
local leaders and the Philippines was a colony of Spain. Even after the Philippines became a unified state, it was a colony of the
United States until 1946. However, the history of the Malay and Moro date back much
further than the creation of Thailand and the
Philippines, which has had an impact on the
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current separatist movements.
Thailand
The beginnings of modern Thai history can be traced to the eleventh through
thirteenth centuries when the ethnic group,
the Thai, began migrating south from China
and controlling regions in China as well as
in the Northern provinces of modern‑day
Thailand (Wyatt 2003, 30). However, prior
to the Thai arrival, three ethnic groups, the
Mon, Khmer, and the Malay, resided in the
area of Thailand and controlled independent
provinces. Of these three ethnic groups, only
the Malay in the south were animists, and
the Mon and Khmer, sometimes placed together as the Mon-Khmer, were Buddhist
(Wyatt 2003, 20). The Thai created local
leadership similar to that already existing in
the provinces. In time, the Mon and Khmer
assimilated with the Thai, as they shared a
common faith and Chinese heritage. Meanwhile, the southern provinces of Thailand,
Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun were controlled under the local area of Malacca until
1511 (Harish 2006, 50). At this point, the
Portuguese had overtaken Malacca and all of
the provinces were placed under the watch
of the Kingdom of Siam (Thai government).
This new arrangement included the payments of tribute to the king, but the provinces were allowed to retain local leadership,
often called rajas or kings (Harish 2006, 50).
Around this same time, trade boomed in the
southern provinces and with it brought the
Islamic religion (Islam 1998, 443). It
quickly became the dominant faith in the
south by the late fifteenth century, and being
Malay and being Muslim became synonymous. For the next two centuries, the three
southern provinces would continue to
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govern themselves, occasionally
engaging in skirmishes with the
Siam government but never being under direct control.
In 1785, after numerous rebellions
and refusals to pay tribute, the King of
Siam overthrew the raja of the provinces
and placed them under direct Siam control
(Islam 1998, 443). Despite being under the
control of the Thai government, the raja retained some local status and could be influential in the southern provinces. This would
end when in 1901, when under pressure
from the British government the Siamese
government created an official administrative body to rule the “area of the seven provinces” (Harish 2006, 51). In essence this created a “unified” Thailand (than called Siam),
so that the king had official control over all
of the provinces of Thailand – thus finally
ending the power of local southern leaders.
From this point until 1932, with the
marginalization of the king and the creation
of a democracy in Thailand, the Malay had
virtually no representation in the government. With the establishment of a democracy in Thailand, the Malay won some minimal spots in the National Assembly and Parliament (Harish 2006, 52). It would seem
that Thailand was beginning a promising
new government, including plurality in and
representation from all provinces. However,
in 1938, the fledgling democracy was deposed in a coup and Thailand was forced
under the control of the military (composed
mainly of Thai Buddhists). This would drastically change the quality of life for the Malay in the south and affect relations between
the Thai Buddhists and the Malay throughout the twentieth century.
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The Philippines
The Philippines faced a similar early
historical path to that of Thailand. The islands that compose the Philippines were inhabited by many ethnic groups, collectively
termed Malayo-Polynesian (Islam 1998,
444). They were governed by local leaders,
often termed sultans. The Moro resided
largely in the southern province of Mindanao. No unified state of the Philippines
existed and outside influences from Malaysia remained a force in political life. Similarly to Thailand, Islam was introduced in
the southern provinces in the early fourteenth century through trade (Islam 1998,
444). Soon it too became the dominant religion, most closely associated with the Moro.
Shortly after Islam was introduced in the
Philippines, the Spanish gained control of
the southern provinces of Mindanao and
Sulu (predominately Moro in composition)
in 1565 (Islam 1998, 444). The Spanish
never officially gained a mandate over these
provinces but governed them as a colony
anyway. This is exemplified most predominately in the attempts by the Spanish to convert the Moro to Catholicism. Their efforts
were largely unsuccessful so the Spanish
began to “reallocate” Moro land to Spanish
Catholics (and those they are able to convert) in an attempt to forcibly change the
religious and ethnic composition of the
southern provinces.
Despite the fact that the Philippines
were never officially a Spanish territory, and
that Spanish control was maintained largely
only in the southern provinces of Mindanao
and Sulu, the Spanish relinquished control of
the Philippines to the United States in 1899
as part of the Bates Treaty that ended the
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Spanish-American War. The Philippines would not gain independence until 1946, until that time the
United States created the Manila Government to rule over the Philippines.
During American rule in the Philippines,
there was occasional conflict between the
government and the Moro. This led to the
creation of the Moro Province, encompassing the provinces of Sulu and Mindanao, a
special administrative area created to preemptively quell any growing dissidence
(Magdalena 1977, 300). The Manila Government claimed that it was actively trying
to redistribute land back to the Moro people,
whose land was stripped from them under
the Spanish and were working as tenant
farmers on the land. However, in reality little ancestral land was given back to the
Moro and tenant farming remained the predominant practice until the 1960s, and not
until the late 1980s did any significant land
redistribution take place (Noble 1976a, 406).
This created a system under which the Moro
differed religiously, ethnically, geographically, and financially from the majority of
Filipinos.
Beginnings of Separatist Movements
Separatist tensions in both Thailand
and the Philippines began to emerge in the
late 1940s and early 1950s, as a reaction to
government policies. In Thailand, the military coup in 1938 created an unstable political atmosphere in which the pattern of attempted forced assimilation by the government on the Malay became an increasing
issue. This included the eradication of the
Malay language in schools, regulated curriculum in punohs (religious schools), and
government pressure for Malays to take Thai

names (Harish 2006, 52). Haji Sulong became the leader of the first separatist movement in Thailand, the Islamic Council of the
Pattani Province, sending a list of demands
to the Thai government in April 1947
(Christie 1996, 183). Among the demands
were a separate court that would recognize
the Islamic faith for the basis of the law, for
money derived from the southern provinces
to be utilized in those provinces, and for the
restoration of the Malay language in schools
as well as for it to be the official language of
the three southern provinces (Islam 1998,
444). Sulong and some of his supporters
were arrested in 1948 for treason, resulting
in a steady stream of violence for the remainder of the year ending with the declaration of a state of emergency in the southern
provinces that would last for a decade. In
1959, as the emergency was ending, the
BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan
Patani) was being formed by Tengku Abdul
Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong’s in the
1940s (Islam 1998, 446). The BNPP was the
precursor to the current separatist groups the
BRN and the PULO, its aims included an
independent Islamic state (Islam 1998, 446).
In the Philippines, the Magsaysay
administration continued the policy of stripping the Moro of their ancestral lands by
hastening migration of northern Filipinos
and Catholics into the southern regions
(Noble 1976a, 406). The government
claimed to undertake this movement to increase production in the southern provinces,
which were producing below capacity, and
thus solve the problems that were arising
from an increasing population and low productivity levels (Noble 1976a, 406). However, this had a negative effect on the
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Moros, as the Catholics and northern Filipinos soon became the majority in the south. A combination of
Catholics and non‑Moro northerners
thus gained control of the local government positions and wealth in the region –
and often over Moro land, as few of the
Moros who lived and worked on their ancestral lands had legal documents to prove ownership (Noble 1976a, 407). This resulted in
their land being taken by the Catholics and
wealthier Filipinos who effectively controlled the legal system in the south. The
first coordinated separatist group formed as
a reaction to the Corregidor Incident in
1968. In March 1968, the Filipino government was planning an attack on Sabah, Malaysia. Sabah was a popular trading port that
the government believed to be a smuggling
area for Moros. In order to undertake the
attack, the government constructed an all‑Moro military unit. However, as the Moro
were actively engaged in trade in Sabah and
many Moro had relatives there, the Moro
soldiers refused their orders. The Thai officials claimed that the soldiers staged an uprising in which thirty Moro soldiers were
killed. However, the incident was interpreted
differently by the Moro, who believed that
the government murdered the soldiers and
purposefully attempted to send an all‑Moro
unit to Sabah (Noble 1976a, 408). Following
the incident, Udtog Matalam formed the first
organized separatist movement, MIM
(Muslim Independence Movement), which
the government disbanded in 1970 (Noble
1976a, 408). However, MIM was an important precursor to a currently active separatist
group, the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front).
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The movements took different paths
after this point in time. In Thailand, periodic
uprisings were undertaken by various
groups, but there was not consistent separatist violence from one group until a larger
undertaking in the 1980s and later the most
recent violence occurring since 2004. Conversely, in the Philippines in the 1960s several separatist groups emerged and became
staples in the conflict until the present.
Modern Separatist Groups in Thailand
The two main separatist groups that
currently operate in Thailand are the BRN
(National Revolutionary Front) and the
PULO (Patani United Liberation Organization). The BRN retained the religious underpinnings of the BNPP, as well as responding
to economic issues developing in the southern provinces. The decline in the rubber
market in the 1960s disproportionately affected the southern provinces and thus disproportionately impoverished Muslims as
compared to the rest of Thailand (Islam
1998, 447). The BRN remains a largely secretive group, the leaders are unknown and
the group rarely discussed its goals until recently, when it declared that it is attempting
to create an independent state through revolution. The PULO, unlike the BRN, is secular in nature but still aims to create an independent Pattani state. The group was formed
by college graduates who had received their
degrees abroad, only to come back to Thailand and be unable to work as no one would
hire them (Tan-Mullins 2006, 146). This has
caused some graduates to leave Thailand,
and a marked absence of educated Malay in
leadership positions in the Thai government.
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Modern Separatist Groups in the
Philippines
Almost directly after the disbanding of MIM, the MNLF, the youth
branch of MIM, came to the forefront.
It directly outlined its political goals as
well as the reasons for the formation of the
group. Openness and clarity would remain a
characteristic of the MNLF, as the leaders of
the group are well known and have throughout the struggle been in periodic discussions
with the government. While the Moro identify based on religion as well as culture, the
MNLF focused on broader shared goals, including economic disparities in the southern
provinces and government failures to respond to inequality. In doing so, the MNLF
created a larger scope and support base for
their cause than did Thai separatist groups.
As a result, when the government declared
martial law in October 1972, the MNLF had
support not only in the Philippines but also
in Malaysia which actively funded the group
in the 1970s and 1980s (Noble 1976a, 411).
Differences in Separatist Movements
The separatist movements in Thailand and the Philippines share some similar
qualities, including a minority Muslim ethnic group, movements originating at approximately the same time, and semi-defined
goals for independent states/regions. However, the orientation of the modern dominant
groups in each country has affected the nature of the conflict within the country. The
BRN retains a pure Islamic message, which
has limited its membership (i.e. the PULO).
Additionally, the relative silence and secrecy
of the group has hindered the possibility of
communication with the government. This
has created an atmosphere of suspicion in
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the southern provinces of Thailand, where
even Malays living in the southern provinces
often remark that they are unsure of who is
or is not a member of the BRN (Tan-Mullins
2006, 145). Conversely, membership in the
MNLF has exceeded the tens of thousands at
its peak, with the names and faces of top
leaders well known throughout the country.
The broader message of the MNLF has allowed for compromise, as seen in the recent
peace talks with the government that resulted in the signing of a peace treaty. Despite the Filipino courts’ failure to approve
the treaty and subsequent relapse of violence
in August 2008, the leaders of the MNLF
were willing and able to meet with and compromise on issues of importance to the
Moro, Muslims, and people of the southern
provinces. It is evident that the nature of the
separatist organizations has influenced the
level of success or failure the movements
will have diplomatically; however, it has
been the governments’ responses to the
separatist movements that have influenced
the severity of the groups and the violence
that stems from them.
Government Action in Thailand and the
Philippines
Action taken in part by the governments in
Thailand and the Philippines has fueled
separatist groups. In Thailand, the government’s relentless pursuit of a national identity has caused the Malay to react by fighting
relentlessly to maintain their cultural traditions. In the Philippines, the government’s
misappropriation of land left the Moro underrepresented politically and devastated
financially. However, it is the capacity of the
government to manage these issues that has
most directly affected the ability of the
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government to mitigate separatist
violence.
Initial Government Responses to
Separatist Movements
In the Philippines, major separatist organization began after the Corregidor Incident of 1968 and the subsequent
consolidation of President Marcos power in
1972. One of Marcos’s first actions as president was to declare martial law in the southern provinces. This included a massive reassignment of troops, with over 70 percent stationed in the southern provinces. Additionally, from 1972 through 1978 Marcos consolidated and strengthened his power as
president. This included the firing of over
2000 government positions, a referendum
that allowed him to appoint local officials,
and Marcos holding both the positions of
president and prime minister (Noble 1976b,
180). Despite the increased power of Marcos, he chose to negotiate with the MNLF
leaders. A ceasefire was quickly established
and maintained. Beginning in 1975, the
MNLF leaders presented their goals to the
Islamic Conference in Jeddah (OIC). The
MNLF wanted a politically autonomous region, which would be comprised of thirteen
southern provinces including all of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago (Noble
1976b, 181). President Marcos responded by
offering autonomy but not full independence; instead, four regions would be constructed from the thirteen provinces. Each
region would have a commissioner that
would be directly under his (Marcos’s) authority as well as the placement of Muslims
in additional government positions focused
on economic and social development (Noble
1976b, 181). The general terms were ac-
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cepted by both the MNLF and Marcos.
However, as the fine details of the peace
agreement were being negotiated, the MNLF
called for full autonomy and the implementation of Muslim leaders and law in the
southern provinces. The government refused
to accept these terms since in some of the
thirteen proposed regions Muslims did not
constitute the majority. The reason that Muslims did not constitute a majority in all of
the southern provinces was a result of the
Catholic “land reallocation” pursued by the
government during Spanish colonization.
Following a vote, only ten of the thirteen
regions voted for autonomy and the Tripoli
peace agreement subsequently fell apart.
Hence, colonial policies continued to not
only affect Filipino society but also hinder
peaceful coexistence.
Despite the failure to complete a
peace agreement between the MNLF and the
Filipino government, an important precedent
was set by the Marcos administration. Even
though Marcos governed the Philippines in
an authoritarian manner and amassed exorbitant control by undemocratic means, the
government was willing to negotiate with
the separatist groups in order to attempt to
create peace in the Philippines. Working
through the OIC created a positive dialogue
between the government and the separatist
leaders. Marcos was successful in establishing a five‑year period of relative peace, especially following the 1976 ceasefire. This
precedent allowed future negotiations and
discussions between the government and
main separatist groups in the Philippines,
which has contributed to peace talks between the government and the MNLF for the
last three decades. The value that Marcos
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placed on negotiations became informally institutionalized in a sense,
carrying through to future administrations and creating what would become a
mechanism for separatist groups to air
their grievances and communicate their
goals; in essence, this created additional
political avenues for separatists as opposed
to using purely violent means to communicate with the government.
Thailand, instead of responding both
diplomatically and militarily as the Philippines did, chose only military means to respond to separatism. This resulted in a markedly different outcome. With aid from the
United States, Thailand began counterinsurgency efforts including the reassignment of
troops to the southern provinces. In 1974,
the ISOC (Internal Security Operational
Command) was formed as a subdivision of
the military to directly combat separatist action; which continues to operate in Thailand
and the southern provinces. During this
time, Thailand was politically unstable; student organization was squashed by the military followed by a military coup in 1976
(Morell and Samudavanija 1979, 319-20).
This, along with increasing tensions between
the military and the CPT (Communist Party
of Thailand), created a government unable
and unwilling to negotiate with separatist
groups. In response, separatist violence increased throughout the 1970s, particularly
among the PULO. Unlike in the Philippines,
in which separatist leaders openly communicated with the government and their names
and positions were well known throughout
the country, in Thailand an environment of
secrecy abounded. This was evident not only
in the main separatist groups, the PULO and

the BRN, but also in other politically motivated groups such as the CPT. Both the
separatist groups and the CPT retreated into
the hills of southern Thailand. Just as the
peace talks with Marcos placed value on
open communication, so too did the actions
of the Thai military in the 1970s; however,
the Thai government created an environment
in which identifying, let alone negotiating
with, separatist groups became elusive.
Government Responses to Separatist
Movements in the 1980s
After the failed peace negotiations in
the Philippines of the early 1970s, violence
once again began to increase throughout the
early 1980s particularly as corruption increased in the Marcos administration and
economic and social issues went unresolved.
However, in 1986 Marcos was ousted during
the four‑day February Revolution, also referred to as the EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) Revolution (Villegas 1987,
194). The end of the revolution was accomplished through the resignation of Marcos
and a new democratically elected government coming to power under President
Corazon Aquino (Villegas 1987, 195).
Aquino established a platform based on economic growth and an end to the insurgency;
she began to recreate the stability necessary
for these two goals to be accomplished. This
included the reinstatement of civil liberties
such as the writ of habeas corpus, freeing of
political prisoners, and face‑to‑face meetings with the leaders of the MNLF (Villegas
1987, 196-97). Additionally, Aquino made
efforts to renegotiate the peace agreement
originally proposed under Marcos. The Republic Act 6734 put the original peace
agreement back up for vote in a referendum
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in 1989; however, only four of the
provinces voted for the act (Rabasa
and Chalk 2001, 92). Despite only
four of the thirteen provinces voting in
favor of the referendum, the ARMM
(Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) was created in 1990. The ARMM
operates as an autonomous government; the
governments of the four provinces that voted
in favor of inclusion are under the ARMM
(Bertrand 2000, 40). It may appear as if the
MNLF had reached its goal of an autonomous Mindanao and would subsequently no
longer act as a separatist group. However,
the group deemed the inclusion of only four
of the thirteen provinces unacceptable and it
continued to exist and communicate with the
government.
The new policies of the Filipino government in the 1980s focused on tempering
the insurgency through means other than
martial law or direct military involvement.
Instead Aquino focused on issues of stability
throughout the country that were necessary
for a functioning democracy, including
greater institutional capacity after the centralized power under Marcos. Within a year
of the revolution, the economy in the Philippines had improved and Aquino actively
worked to improve the Philippines’ image
abroad as well as to reduce the Philippines’
external debt (Villegas 1987, 201). This
policy was overall effective in reducing the
amount of widespread violence from separatist groups. While some violent outbreaks
continued in the southern provinces, there
was a clear reduction in the amount and severity of attacks.
During the 1980s, a secondary separatist group came to the forefront in the Phil-
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ippines, when the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), an offshoot of the MNLF
gained a following. This later complicated
communication with the government, as the
government was accustomed to negotiating
with the MNLF and on several occasions
failed to include the MILF in the discussions, which only aided in fueling violence
from the MILF.
There was a significant decrease in
violence in Thailand in the 1980s. This was
due in part to the actions of General Prem
Tinsulanonda as prime minister (1980 to
1988) to liberalize and create institutionalized changes in Thailand (Melvin 2007, 34).
These changes were facilitated by an expanding economy and rapid industrialization
in Thailand. Prior to the 1980s Thailand had
relied on the export of agricultural products,
resulting in Thailand having some of the
lowest wages in the region and widespread
poverty (Hussey 1993, 14). While the Southern Malay Provinces remained largely engaged in agriculture, the significant gains
Thailand made beginning in 1985, led it to
be dubbed “Asia’s fifth tiger” (Hussey 1993,
14). With expanding economic power came
an increase in educational funding and political awareness, which had begun to become evident in the 1970s during the October Revolution, with the increase in student
political activity and the creation of the CPT
(Paribatra 1993, 882). The media became
freer to operate independently of the government, political parties grew and expanded,
and there was the creation of a middle class
in Thailand (Paribatra 1993, 883). These
represent positive changes in Thailand, in
which legitimate institutions existed through
which Thai citizens could express their
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political beliefs. The freedom of
the press is crucial in creating accountability and transparency in a
government. Additionally, increased
political activity and political options
(more political parties) allowed for a plurality not yet seen in Thai politics.
In addition to political and social
changes, changes were implemented to addressseparatist concerns in the southern
provinces as well. A military-civilian court
was established to allow Malay citizens to
report crimes that occurred during the military reign in the 1970s (Macan-Markar
2006). This was done in an attempt to reconcile the egregious crimes committed during
military rule including the “disappearance”
of many Malay activists, the military imprisonment of large groups of civilians, and the
killing of suspected separatist sympathizers.
The goal was to foster greater understanding
between Thai Buddhists and Malays regarding the political situation in the south. The
creation of a court to address the problems
of the Malay signified the changing role of
the government in Thailand. The government began to take political steps to institutionalize the role of the southern provinces
within the Thai government.
Prime Minister Tinsulanonda created CPM 43, a new security taskforce.
Unlike the security forces present in the
south in the past, CPM 43 was subject to the
constitution of Thailand and therefore could
not hold civilians against Thai law (Melvin
2007, 13). Not only had the manner in which
the government ensured security in the south
changed, but also the administration of the
southern provinces was changed in 1981. In
conjunction with CPM 43, the Southern Bor-
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der Provinces Administration Centre,
(SBPAC) was formed (Melvin 2007, 13).
This allowed greater control of the southern
provinces by local officials and established
amnesty for former separatists. This was part
of the new government push for political
participation and legitimate institutions
rather than focusing directly on the eradication of separatist groups. This was a clear
sign of the increasing capacity of the government. The Thai government had the capability not only to create institutions but
also to ensure their success through nonmilitary means, a crucial aspect missing in state
response prior to and after the 1980s. This
had not been possible prior to this point in
Thai history. However, the fragility of the
emerging democracy was challenged in the
early 1990s, when the plummeting economy
in Thailand and a lack of full transparency
by the government reversed the progress of
the 1980s.
Government Action in the 1990s
In 1988, Prem Tinsulanonda stepped
down as prime minister and Chatichai
Choonhavan became the first prime minister
to be an elected member of Parliament
(Neher 1992, 595). It appeared as if the democratic transition in Thailand would occur
effectively and peacefully. However these
prospects were set back in 1991 when a military coup overthrew the elected Thai government. The coup was unexpected and surprised Thai government officials as well as
the international community. There were
several reasons why the coup occurred. With
the increase in political parties and plurality
in the 1980s came widespread factionalism
in Thai politics. No one political party could
hold a majority in parliament,
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so coalitions were necessary. However, coalition alliances changed
quickly and the past problems of corruption still haunted Thailand. With the
freedom of the press instituted under
Tinsulanonda, the corruption was reported on an almost daily basis. This, combined with the frustration of the Thai public
with the incapability/unwillingness of the
government to institute policies to decrease
the gap between the wealthy elites and the
poor majority, led to discontent in the country. Thus, when the military coup occurred
in 1991, there were no immediate protests to
the overthrow of the elected government
(Neher 1992, 596).
The military coup was led by a group
that called itself the National Peace Keeping
Council, which appointed Anand Panyarachun as interim prime minister (Paribatra
1993, 887). Panyarachun worked on creating
a Thai constitution (which became effective
in 1997) and economic reforms. Elections
were scheduled for March 1992. The elections resulted in the appointment of General
Suchinda Kraprayoon (a member of the National Peace Keeping Council) as prime minister. Tensions quickly flared as Kraprayoon
was not an elected member of Parliament.
The Prime Minister attempted to relieve tensions by claiming that he would support an
amendment to the constitution that Panyarachun had begun work on, that would make it
necessary for the prime minister to be a
member of Parliament. The coalition majority supported the proposed amendment but
stipulated that Kraprayoon should remain
prime minister for the duration of his term.
This resulted in what came to be known as
Black May in Thailand (Paribatra 1993,

888). Black May began on May 17, 1992
and continued until May 20. Hundreds of
thousands of Thai citizens protested the premiership of Kraprayoon. The military initially responded by trying to violently suppress the protesters, resulting in approximately fifty deaths and hundreds of arrests.
Under clear public scrutiny the coalition decided to enact the amendment that would
stipulate that the prime minister had to be an
elected member of Parliament, thus, ending
Kraprayoon’s term as Prime Minister
(Shenon 1992). Anand Panyarachun, the interim prime minister from the military coup,
reinstated himself as prime minister. The
military leaders of the Kraprayoon administration were removed from their positions,
and relative peace returned to Thailand for a
time (Paribatra 1993, 890). However, the
problems that reigned during Choonhavan’s
premiership continued, namely widespread
poverty in the southern provinces, which
continued to be ignored due to the political
instability in the central government.
Thailand faced a severe economic
downturn in the late 1990s, along with many
other Asian countries. The growth that had
begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s was
created largely through foreign investments
and loans. When the bubble on growth
“burst” in the late 1990s, investors pulled
out of Thailand and the government owed
large amounts of money to outside investors
(Pempel 1999, 149-150). In addition, the
gap between the elite and the poor in Thailand was never adequately addressed during
Thailand’s economic growth; as such the
poorest in Thailand were most effected by
the downturn. During this time separatist
violence in Thailand was almost
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nonexistent, leading some to believe that the groups were no longer
active. However, despite the signing
of the new constitution in 1997, democratic initiatives in Thailand were overturned with the premiership of Thaksin
Shinawatra in 2001.
Similarly to Thailand, the early
1990s represented a time of relatively little
separatist violence in the Philippines. After
the February or People Power Revolution in
1986, the subsequent administrations were
considered to be legitimate by both the general public in the Philippines as well as by
the main separatist movements (the MNLF
and the MILF) (Bertrand 2000, 38). Coinciding with the precedent set by Marcos, the
Ramos government attempted to reconvene
peace talks with the MNLF. Despite the
creation of the ARMM, the MNLF wanted
more provinces to be included in the administrative region. Unlike Marcos’s administration, the new Filipino government was truly
democratic and as such a lasting agreement
seemed possible. Both the Filipino government and the MNLF had confidence that the
other would uphold their end of the peace
talks. The Ramos government had shown
that democracy was becoming entrenched in
the Philippines and the MNLF gained legitimacy through their backing by the OIC
(Bertrand 2000, 39). These were the conditions under which the 1996 Peace Agreement was signed.
The agreement was largely based off
of the initial Tripoli Agreement set out by
Marcos. An administrative council, the
SPCPD was placed in charge of the execution of the agreement. The implementation
of the agreement took place over a three‑-
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year period in which members of the MNLF
were given positions in the military as well
as the police, in addition to top spots in the
SPCPD. Then, after the establishment of the
SPCPD, a consolidation of the SPCPD and
the ARMM created one administrative body
for the fourteen then‑independent provinces,
after a vote by the fourteen provinces
(Bertrand 2000, 42). In theory, the creation
of these administrative bodies would create
lasting institutions and a political framework
through which separatist leaders could engage politically.
Problems began to emerge within the
ARMM and the SPCPD shortly after their
creation. Both have been plagued by mismanagement (in particular with regards to
the budget), and the SPCPD had an uncertain role. The SPCPD was set up to be a
transitory organization; it was not created to
remain a part of the administration of the
ARMM. As such the SPCPD holds little real
power; its function instead is to convene to
make suggestions to the Filipino government
(Bertrand 2000, 47). The ARMM has been
accused of acting as the “implementing arm
of the government” (Bertrand 2000, 48) as
opposed to an administrative body that
represents the interests of the local communities.
There were several problems stemming from the peace agreement that made
the possibility of a lasting peace settlement
unlikely. First, the MNLF has been steadily
losing power in the southern provinces. With
the relative peace of the 1990s and a legitimate government, membership decreased.
Additionally, the breakaway of the MILF
(the military branch of the MNLF) left the
MNLF with decreased military power as
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well as influence (due to decreased
numbers). This made the MNLF
eager to sign a peace agreement. Second, only four provinces voted to join
the ARMM in 1989 and the likelihood
of the remaining provinces voting to join
only a few years later was slim especially
due to the decrease in separatist supporters.
This limited participation made the creation
of an actual autonomous region difficult.
Also, the widespread corruption and inefficiency of the ARMM and the SPCPD made
their success unlikely. These two factors together, a weakened MNLF and the limited
number of provinces willing to join the
ARMM, set the agreement up for failure. To
complicate matters further, the MILF opposed the signing of the Peace Agreement.
This was because the MILF claimed that the
agreement failed to address the problem of
the loss of Moro ancestral lands. Also, while
they agree that it may have solved the problems of the MNLF, they believed that it did
not address the true problems of the Moro
people (which the MILF claimed to represent) (Bauzon 1999, 264).
The Current State of Separatist
Movements
Amid the fallout of the problems of the 1996
Peace Agreement, the 1998 elections were a
large loss for the MNLF and a new president
was elected, former Vice President Joseph
Estrada. Estrada’s presidency set the backdrop for the rising tensions in the Philippines. Estrada stepped down as president in
2000, facing allegations of payoffs from illegal gambling. A resurgence in violence followed, with an increase in violence and kidnappings in 2000. After Estrada stepped
down as president, Vice President Gloria

Arroyo became president of the Philippines
(Montesano 2004, 94). Separatist violence
continued to grow during Arroyo’s first
term, with other political issues prohibiting
the government from addressing separatist
groups. The government was plagued with
problems, including attacks by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on military bases and continuing accusations of political corruption (Montesano 2004, 95-96).
This corresponded with bombings by the
MILF, the now more violent and powerful
separatist group (Montesano 2004, 96).
Once again, peace talks were initiated to try to put an end to the violence in
the southern provinces. In late 2003 Arroyo
met with the MILF, and not the MNLF,
along with the OIC to attempt to put into
place a ceasefire and initiate peace talks
(Montesano 2004, 97). The peace talks resulted in yet another peace agreement in the
Philippines. In keeping with the pattern in
the Philippines, in January 2005 the MILF
fighters attacked government troops and the
ceasefire was broken, resulting in another
three years of violence (Montlake 2008).
The most recent action in the Philippines
maintains this pattern as well. In August
2008, the Filipino government and the MILF
leaders reached an agreement to expand the
size of the ARMM. This would have solidified a “homeland” for the Moro. However
the Filipino Supreme Court issued a ruling
to block the signing of the agreement, as it
was seen as possibly unconstitutional and
called for a hearing in which both the government and the separatist leaders would
speak (Montlake 2008). This action by the
Supreme Court was deemed unacceptable by
the MILF leaders and violence has once
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again marred the southern provinces. Hundred of thousands of people have been displaced and hundreds
killed in the ensuing violence that continues as Filipino security forces attempt to hunt down the MILF leaders.
Despite relative peace in the 1980s
and 1990s in Thailand, the turn of the twenty
-first century saw a renewal of violence that
had been dormant for thirty years. Following
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
Prime Minister Thaksin wanted to appear as
if separatist violence had ended in Thailand
as the United States announced a war on terror. Clearly, this was due to a fear of a U.S.
invasion in Thailand as part of this war on
terror. Thaksin attempted to eradicate indications of past separatism within Thailand
(Storey 2008, 36). This included the dismantling of CPM 43 and the SBPAC, some of
the only successful political institutions related to separatist violence Thailand had
been able to create and maintain. Thaksin
than installed local provincial leaders who
would respond directly to him (Storey 2008,
37). These actions taken by Thaksin undermined the positive democratic changes that
had taken place in Thailand and created instability with the removal of key institutions
(i.e. CPM 43 and the SBPAC). Thaksin returned to the Thai tradition of centralized
democracy, in an attempt to increase the
power of his political party Thai Rak Thai,
which had received little support from the
south in the previous elections (Bajoria and
Zissis 2008). Renewed violence emerged in
the south in January 2004, including daily
assassinations and kidnappings. Thaksin responded by declaring martial law in the
southern provinces.
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Thaksin quickly lost support as violence continued to wreak havoc on the country and in 2006 he was replaced in a military
coup (Bajoria and Zissis 2008). An interim
prime minister was appointed and the
SBPAC and CPM 43 were reinstalled. The
Thai government attempted peace talks with
separatist leaders for the first time. However,
the government still does not know who the
leaders or members of the BRN (BRN-C)
and the PULO are, so secondary leaders of
disbanded groups were consulted. Due to
this, the peace talks did not occur with current members of separatist groups, and as
such the peace talks were not effective in
resolving the current separatist violence.
Violence continued and worsened in the
southern provinces, peaking in 2007. There
have been over 1,500 casualties since the
fighting began again in 2004. Martial law
continued in the southern provinces, with the
military having full control of the region
(Bajoria and Zissis 2008). This is a clear
violation of the SPBAC, which is supposed
to be in control of security in the south and
has to follow Thai laws. Under martial law,
the military does not have to comply with
Thai laws and historically has not, instead
committing heinous acts against the local
Malay population. The most recent protests,
in April 2009, exhibit the weakness of the
Thai government. Thousands of protestors
marched on the capital, Bangkok, disrupting
the New Year festivities and inciting violence from the police. The protestors are not
separatist members, but citizens frustrated
by the corruption and political instability in
Thailand. The attention now focused on the
protests once again distracts the government
from focusing on separatist violence. As
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government attempts to control the
protests, violence mars the southern
provinces.
In Thailand, where institutions have
been largely incapable of keeping up
with the demand for response from the
public, when attempts to institute policies
that would aid the Malay were tried they
have failed. This is evident historically, as
no lasting political institutions were created
in the sixty years since separatist violence
began with the exception of CPM 43 and the
SBPAC, and even they were dismantled for
a period of time. A more recent example can
be seen in the period following martial law
in 2004, when the government held elections
for Tambon councils (local administrative
bodies) as well as PAOs (Provincial Administrative Organizations). In theory, this
would have created power at the local level
and representation for differing viewpoints
(i.e. the Malay). Additionally, as 35 percent
of budgets must be approved by the PAO, it
would have allowed for Malay representation on financial matters (Albritton 2005,
170). However, by the end of the year the
results had still not been confirmed by the
government (Albritton 2005, 171). This pattern of government repression followed by
attempts at reconciliation, each time too
weak to reach demands, had repeated itself
throughout the twentieth century and continued into the twenty‑first century, each time
eliciting an angered and violent response
from the BRN.
Conversely in the Philippines, institutions were in place to address the grievances of the people. For example, beginning
in the 1950s the Filipino government passed
a series of Land Reform Acts that were
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aimed at ending the cycle of tenant farming
that was impoverishing the Moro. The original Land Reform Acts called for the tenant
farmer to pay the taxes on the land in order
to regain the land; however, the amount of
the taxes owed per parcel of land was an unattainable amount for the Moro, and as such
the acts as they stood aided fewer than
50,000 people within the first thirty years of
its passing. However, due to the strong institutions present in the Philippines there were
committees and councils through which the
Moro could explain their concerns. Recent
Land Reform Acts, in the last decade, have
been more successful as share tenancy has
been outlawed and institutions such as the
Department of Agrarian Reform were established to monitor progress and work toward
greater social justice.
Analysis
After chronicling the development of
the separatist movements and the government responses to them, it is important to
analyze how government action has affected
separatist violence. There are two components upon which the case studies will be
analyzed: state capacity and crisis vs. noncrisis transitions (a theory about democratic
transitions). State capacity will be used to
explain government action in Thailand and
the Philippines from the 1940s to the 1970s,
while crisis vs. noncrisis theory will be used
to explain government action in the 1980s
and early 1990s (post–democratic transition), and both capacity and crisis vs. noncrisis theory will be used to explain the current
separatist situation in each country.
State capacity refers to the governments’ ability to enact change, create institutions and infrastructure, and maintain
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political stability within the country. The crisis vs. noncrisis transition theory, as proposed by Stephen
Haggard and Robert Kaufman, will be
applied not to the democratic transitions
within Thailand and the Philippines
(though they both fit the model), but instead
as a guideline through which to characterize
government responses to separatist violence.
State Capacity
Before their democratic transitions,
Thailand and the Philippines represented
different levels of state capacity. Thailand
had low state capacity, was politically unstable (frequent military coups) and lacked the
ability to create meaningful and lasting institutions. However, the Philippines had high
state capacity, with routine peace negotiations occurring between the President of the
Philippines and the leaders of the MNLF
beginning in 1975. Additionally, the Philippines began land reform acts in the 1960s
and 1970s to restore the ancestral lands of
the Moro.
Thailand suffered from issues surrounding low state capacity, which can be
compared to theories that were presented in
Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in
Changing Societies. Huntington stated that
as political consciousness increases, as a result of increased literacy, education, and industrialization, so too will political demands
and participation. If a state, in this example
Thailand, were to be unable to meet those
expanding political demands, then the state’s
ability to create new institutions as well as
the integrity of the current political institutions would be greatly undermined
(Huntington 2006, 5). This can be seen in
Thailand from the beginning of the govern-
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ment’s reaction to the separatist movement.
As an attempt at conciliation, the Thai government passed the Patronage of Islam Act
in 1945. The Act was aimed at addressing
the complaints of the southern provinces,
namely the Thai government’s attempts at
forced assimilation. The act created a position within the Thai government for an Islamic advisor, the chularajamontri, to the
Thai king (Marshallsay 2008, 4). Additionally, shortly after the passing of the Patronage of Islam Act, the Thai government allowed Islamic law to be used in four of the
southern provinces on issues related to heritage and family affairs. However, the Malay
people did not respond as the Thai government expected. The Patronage Act incited
anger among the Malay, as many thought the
creation of an advisor on Islamic affairs to
the king was yet another way for the government to monitor and undermine the Malay.
Additionally, the chularajamontri did not
come from the southern provinces; instead
often the chularajamontri came from the
Bangkok area (Marshallsay 2008, 4). As the
chularajamontri was in control of the local
leaders in the southern provinces and was
their liaison to the central government, this
only confirmed the Malay suspicion that the
chularajamontri was not created in order to
represent their interests, but instead another
mechanism through which Thai control
could be established over the Malay.
Low state capacity prohibited the
government of Thailand from being able to
make progress in reducing separatist violence. What action the government took
seemed to only further the cause of the separatist groups. Due to its low capacity and
ineffective government action, Thailand
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largely relied on the military to
control the terrorist actions of the
separatist groups. This is evident by
the decade‑long emergency called in
response to the formation of the first
separatist groups in 1949. Additionally,
the relative strength of the military in Thai
society (seven military coups since the beginning of separatist violence) made the
military the only lasting governmental force
capable of dealing with separatist violence.
When government action failed and Thailand faced political instability in the 1970s
(a military coup in 1976 as well as violence
stemming from the CPT), the government
created the ISOC to manage separatist violence. Numerous problems emerged from
the government’s decision to allow the military to handle the separatist movements. The
military did not have to follow Thai laws;
this obviously resulted in widespread abuse
in the southern provinces. Individuals were
held without charges, people went missing,
and executions would occur without trials.
This type of military response did not temper separatist groups; it only helped to further their cause with the Malay people. Additionally, the military abuses undermined
the legitimacy of the Thai government and
failed to encourage political action over
separatist violence.
In the Philippines, high state capacity
worked to foster peace negotiations between
the government and separatist leaders. As
stated earlier, President Marcos first met
with separatist leaders in order to engage in
peace negotiations and a ceasefire in 1976.
The ability for a government to effectively
communicate and negotiate with a terrorist
group is a large accomplishment. With the
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OIC acting as a mediator, the government of
the Philippines was able to communicate its
goals and stance to the separatist leaders and
vice versa. This form of open dialogue created a mechanism through which both parties could air their grievances. Additionally,
it institutionalized a political mechanism
through which separatist leaders’ voices
were heard by top government officials. This
would establish the beginnings of political
participation necessary for leaders from the
MNLF to make the transition to local leaders
in the ARMM.
Peace negotiations and ceasefires
were helpful tools in creating temporary
peace in the Philippines. However, there has
yet to be lasting peace as the separatist
groups, namely the MNLF and the MILF
more recently, periodically renew violent
outbursts. This is often done in response to
an unfavorable result in a referendum or because the Filipino government fails to act
fast enough to their demands. The causes of
this reaction will be discussed in the analysis
of “moral hazard” as well as the crisis vs.
noncrisis theory.
Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory
Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory, as designed by Stephen Haggard and Robert
Kaufman, is used to explain democratic transitions. The theory states that economic and
social conditions that are present in a country during its democratic transition will
shape whether it responds in a crisis or noncrisis manner. There are several characteristics that are said to be emblematic of crisis
and noncrisis transitions. In a crisis transition, the government will act quickly, the
opposition powers gain greater influence in
political decisions, and the military and
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communist party are weakened.
According to the theory, a noncrisis
response looks almost the opposite of
a crisis response. The government reacts slowly to threats and power remains with authoritarian figures, the opposition has little role in government, and
the military and communist parties are
strong within the country (Haggard and
Kaufman 1997, 269). The theory presented
is based on governments in transition responding to economic crisis. Haggard and
Kaufman use Thailand and the Philippines
as examples of noncrisis and crisis transitions, respectively, within their theory (270).
However, these characteristics can also be
used to explain the Thai and Filipino governments’ responses to separatist violence
after their democratic transitions.
The Philippines represents a crisis
transition. This is evident in the government’s action toward separatist groups. The
first criterion of a crisis transition is quick
government response to an issue. This is evident in the Philippines in the government’s
repeated negotiations with separatist leaders.
Shortly after violence begins, the president
of the Philippines reengages in negotiations
with the MNLF leaders in order to successfully create a ceasefire and peace agreement.
There have been over six peace agreements
since Marcos’s initial dealings with the
MNLF leaders in 1976. The second criterion
of a crisis response is increased influence
given to the opposition power. This is arguably the Philippines largest problem in fighting separatist violence. The government’s
patterned response of going to the separatist
leaders in order to create peace agreements
has given disproportionate power to leaders
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of the MNLF and the MILF. The government has already created the ARMM and
created government positions for separatist
leaders, and the separatist groups continue to
demand more from the government. This has
led to the breakdown of peace in the south as
the separatist groups seek greater power and
influence in the country. It appears as if the
government’s capacity to create peace agreements and ceasefires backfired due to the
power that it has given the separatist leaders.
The leaders of the MNLF and the MILF are
aware that if they seek more from the Filipino government, all they have to do is create a violent backlash and the government
will return with another peace agreement,
including further provisions to meet their
demands. As such there is no incentive for
the separatist groups to uphold the peace
agreements they enter into, as greater results
can be garnered through violence. The last
two criteria, a weak military and communist
party, are characteristic of the Philippines.
Additionally, the weakness of these two
groups has enabled the government to focus
on the issue of separatist violence, unlike in
Thailand where political instability due to
the power of the military and communist
party has crippled the government’s ability
to act.
Thailand is an example of a noncrisis
response. The government has been slow to
respond to terrorists. This is for two reasons,
the government’s inability to act and subsequent reliance on the military, and the government’s focus on other issues including
violence from the communist party and political instability. Because of this, little political action was taken to temper separatist
groups. The power in the Thai government
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has remained with the central government due to its noncrisis response. The leaders of the BRN/BRNC and the PULO are not known in Thailand and because of the government’s
lack of political action, there was no attempt to negotiate with them in the twentieth century. When recent attempts at peace
negotiations were facilitated by the Thai
government, the government was so unaware of who the separatist leaders were that
officials met with a secondary separatist
leader from a group that has long since been
disbanded. Additionally, the current low capacity of the government has allowed for a
resurgence in violence as actions taken in
part by the government cannot be enforced
(i.e. the re-installation of CPM 43 and the
SBPAC). The separatist groups’ secrecy was
fueled by the government action taken
against the communist party (as both groups
retreated into the hills of the southern provinces) as well as by brutal military action.
This has in part reduced membership in the
group, as it is difficult for the groups to recruit new members due to their secretive nature and secluded locations. The last two criteria have been shown through government
action, and the military’s power is evident in
its task of controlling the southern provinces. The CPT clearly exhibited a great deal
of power, as the threat of the CPT was seen
as greater than the threat of the BRN or the
BRN-C by the Thai government. This is evident by the government focusing its attentions on the CPT as opposed to the separatist
groups. While the Thai government’s noncrisis response has effectively managed tensions (with the exception of periodic violence) and limited the size and scope of
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separatist membership, it has not been able
to mediate separatist violence when it does
occur. The military has only been able to
suppress the violence, not stop it. Once separatist violence begins, the Thai government
does not have the mechanisms and institutions in place to arbitrate the conflict.
Issues for Future Peace in Thailand and
the Philippines
Both Thailand and the Philippines will need
to alter their policies toward separatist
movements, for either country to be successful in ending separatist violence. In Thailand, the historically weak central government has resulted in the use of military responses to separatist violence and at times
full military control of the south. In the Philippines, the strength of the central government coupled with international support
from the OIC has led to multiple peace negotiations and ceasefires. However, the government’s failure to impose strict consequences for violations of the peace agreements has created a pattern of violence,
through which the separatist groups have
gained greater power over the central government.
Issues in Thailand: Stability and
Diplomacy
As noted previously, the central government of Thailand continues to struggle to
establish political stability. Currently, protests rage in the capital in response to the
recent elections. Until the government can
create lasting stability, including open and
free elections, the government will remain
unable to respond diplomatically to separatist threats. The Thai government’s historical
reliance on the military to control separatist
violence has led to widespread military

152
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/11

20

McDonald: State Capacity, Social Mobility, and Terrorist Groups in Thailand

Great Day 2009

abuses and has left separatist members with no political avenues
through which to express their grievances.
Even if the current government of
Thailand were to sign a peace agreement
with separatist leaders (providing the government could effectively find the leaders of
the main separatist groups, the BRN and the
PULO), the agreements may be of little consequence as the government’s legitimacy is
in question. Also, the ability of the government to follow through on any agreement
would be unlikely. For Thailand to establish
political stability, greater transparency and
institutions that are viewed as legitimate by
the public will need to be put into place. The
beginning of this was seen in the 1980s and
1990s in Thailand, when there was increased
political participation and political awareness. It is not uncommon for a country undergoing a democratic transition to experience increased violence and instability, as
has been the case in Thailand. If Thailand
could reestablish the level of progress it possessed in the 1980s and 1990s, then steps
toward reducing separatist violence could be
taken. This occurred briefly with the creation of the SBPAC and CPM 43 in 1981.
Without diplomatic action, the abuses that
occur under full military control will only
help to further the separatist cause. Additionally, as is occurring presently in Thailand, when there is dissatisfaction in the
country (protestors as well as separatist violence), the government will not have the
mechanisms in place with which to diffuse
the conflict.
Issues in the Philippines: Moral Hazard
The concept of moral hazard applies
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to the peace negotiations between the Philippines and the MNLF, and more recently the
MILF. As earlier stated, the separatist
groups have violated several peace agreements and ceasefires in the last three decades. The reason for this can be explained
through moral hazard. Moral hazard can be
applied to any agreement between two parties; it functions on the principle that parties
will behave according to costs and benefits.
When entering into an agreement, if the
benefits of not following the contract outweigh the costs of breaking the agreement,
then the party may intentionally act in a way
that violates moral norms or the contract itself (Mirrlees 1999).
In the case of the Filipino separatist
groups, the first peace agreement, the Tripoli
Agreement signed in December of 1976,
there were no provisions put in place that
would give the MNLF incentives to abide by
the agreement. There is no mention of repercussions for not following the peace agreement or for breaking the ceasefire. The
agreement outlines the concessions to be
made by the Central Government to the
MNLF, including the creation of an autonomous region in the southern provinces, separate Sharia courts, guaranteed representation
for Muslims in the central government as
well as in all Filipino courts, and amnesty
for political prisoners and separatist group
members for crimes committed in the southern provinces (Government of the Republic
of the Philippines 1976). Concessions to be
made by the MNLF included only certain
areas not to be included in the autonomous
region and a percentage of profits from mining. This agreement conceded to the MNLF
one of its largest goals, the creation of a
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separate autonomous region in the
south to be governed by Muslims
according to Islamic law. However, as
stated, not all of the southern provinces
were to be included in the autonomous
region. The MNLF used this as a reason
to break the agreement and, without penalties for breaking the agreement, incited further violence in the southern provinces. This
led the Central Government to engage in further peace negotiations (and concessions)
with the MNLF and gave the MNLF the
power and influence it wanted in the Philippines.
This is obviously problematic for the
Philippines, despite the government’s ability
to successfully negotiate with separatist
leaders; the negotiations are not effective if
the separatists have no intention or incentive
to follow the stipulations of the ceasefire. In
order to create lasting ceasefires that could
result in an end to separatist violence, the
government needs to enact stringent penalties for breaking a ceasefire or peace agreement. Furthermore, these repercussions need
to be written into the peace agreements so
that they are not merely threats, but legal
ramifications for failure to uphold a contract.
Additionally, if the MNLF or the MILF does
break the peace agreement/ceasefire, the
consequences laid out by the government
must be enforced in the fullest capacity.
Without these consequences, the violence in
the Philippines will continue to escalate as
the separatists seek greater power and influence in the country.
The only attempt to take such action
by the Filipino government was with the
signing of the “Implementing Guidelines on
the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Trip-

oli Agreement of Peace of
2001” (Government of the Republic of the
Philippines 2001). The guidelines established actions taken by the MNLF or the
MILF that would constitute criminal actions
and violations of the agreements established
with the Filipino government. This was a
step forward by the Filipino government in
asserting its authority over the separatist
groups and establishing actions that would
not be tolerated by the government. Additionally, the presence of U.S. military troops
in the southern Philippines temporarily
maintained peace in the region. However,
the government failed to follow through on
the guidelines set forth, as within two years
the government was once again engaging in
peace negotiations with the separatist
groups, despite the failure of the separatist
groups to uphold the guidelines. Additionally, the government has recently attempted
to sign a peace agreement that would expand
the size of the ARMM. This only reaffirms
the process the separatist groups create, creating greater violence to gain greater rewards from the government.
There are several different ways to
deal with the problem of moral hazard in the
Filipino case. The government could simply
place an ultimatum on the separatist groups,
that if they do not comply with future peace
agreements than the government will no
longer negotiate with them. However, considering the track record of the Filipino government separatist groups may not take the
ultimatum seriously. Additionally, if the
government were to diplomatically cut off
the separatist leaders, then it would only
serve to force the separatist groups outside
of the political system and most likely
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increase the violence in the southern provinces. It is a benefit to the
government that the separatist leaders
have been able to marginally integrate
into the political spectrum; it would be
a mistake to alienate the leaders of these
movements.
The government could continue with
the status quo, in which it is able to procure
relative peace for a short period of time.
However, the pattern that has been created
by the government has already given disproportionate power to the separatist leaders
and the current position of the government
does not provide for long‑term solutions to
the problem of separatist violence. The third
option available to the government is to take
a multifaceted approach to the separatists.
This would include both internal diplomacy,
international support, and a military response to noncooperation. The government
should continue to meet with separatist leaders; it is its direct link to the motivations and
demands of the separatist groups. However,
this does not mean that the government has
to necessarily continue to sign peace agreements and give concessions to the separatist
leaders. Due to the creation of the ARMM,
separatist leaders hold political positions
through which they can participate in government. The Filipino government should
encourage participation through governmental as opposed to extra‑political means. International support is necessary due to the
international support that the MNLF and the
MILF hold. Presently, international support
has been behind the MNLF and the MILF;
this has put the Filipino government in a defensive position that has only worsened the
interests of the Philippines in peace negotia-

tions. With the proper international backing,
the Filipino government can present a
stronger front at negotiations and have international backing if military force is necessary against the separatist groups. This can
also act as a preventative measure, so that
the separatist groups understand that the
Filipino government is serious about the
consequences for breaking a peace agreement or ceasefire. The last component, military force, may be necessary if the separatist
groups continue to be combative. As earlier
stated, it would be a mistake to cut off the
separatist groups diplomatically because of
its important link to the groups’ goals and
motivations. By setting out specific military
consequences to not abiding by peace agreements and ceasefires, separatists will have a
clear understanding of the repercussions of
violating the agreements. This is more effective than the current military action, because
the government has not set guidelines for the
military initiatives. Instead the military is
sent to “hunt” down leaders responsible for
certain events, which turns into several raids
and deaths, but soon the government is once
again negotiating with separatist leaders.
There needs to be a clear plan and goal of a
military initiative, not simply letting troops
loose in the southern provinces, which does
not gain separatist compliance. This last option seems the most viable for long‑term
peace. It addresses not only the immediate
problems of violent outbreaks with military
intervention, but also the long‑term problems of separatist noncompliance. This is
not to say that this plan will create immediate peace. It is likely that any new initiative
the government takes against separatist violence will, in the short run at least, increase
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separatist violence. This is because
the separatists are quite content with
the status quo, as it benefits them and
their goals. However, if the government
can mitigate the short‑term violent response and continue with a plan toward
long‑term peace, then the Philippines will
be able to temper and hopefully eliminate
separatist violence.
Conclusions and Prescriptions
The case studies of Thailand and the
Philippines exemplify differing government
responses to terrorism. Both Thailand and
the Philippines experience separatist violence stemming from minority Muslim ethnic groups in the southern regions of the
countries. However, the governments’ responses to these separatist threats have
shaped the current security situations in the
countries. In Thailand, the country’s low
capacity forced a reliance on the military to
control separatist violence. Without restraints on the military, few legal implementations were used in detaining or executing
prisoners. This abuse contributed to ongoing
separatist violence. In the Philippines, the
government’s high capacity allowed for negotiations with top separatist leaders. However, without restraints placed on the separatist groups to ensure their upholding of the
peace agreement, the MNLF and the MILF
continue to wreak havoc on the southern
provinces in order to gain greater control of
the region.
In this sense, Thailand used only
military means through which to subdue
separatist violence due to the inability of the
government to use diplomatic means;
whereas in the Philippines, the focus of government action has been through diplomatic

SUNY Geneseo

means (though increased military initiatives
have been taken recently), but the lack of
follow‑through by the government to impose strict and meaningful repercussions for
violating peace agreements has resulted in a
cycle of violence.
In order for lasting peace to be
achieved by Thailand and the Philippines
changes, will need to be enacted. In Thailand, the first step toward reduced violence
is strengthening and legitimizing the central
government. Separatist groups in Thailand
were largely dormant in the 1980s and
1990s, when the government was at its peak
effectiveness. It seems that the separatist are
willing to accept positive change in the
country, whether it is political, economic, or
social. When the government focused on
domestic issues and not military intervention
in the south, in the late 1980s and early
1990s, separatist violence was at its lowest
point, since its beginnings in the 1940s.
In the Philippines, the government
needs to create one clear message on how it
will handle separatist violence. As it stands,
the government has historically allowed
separatists to break peace agreements, resort
to violence, and then gain concessions from
the government. Only recently has the government expressed what actions would violate peace agreements. Even after the
“guidelines” were presented, the Filipino
government met again with separatist leaders two more times, to offer an expansion of
provinces in the ARMM. These mixed messages offer no incentive for separatist to cooperate with the government. Even when the
government threatens military repercussions,
the separatist have been willing to deal with
the military for a short period, knowing
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the government will soon offer
new incentives and peace agreements, as in the 2003 and 2008 peace
agreements. The Filipino government
needs to not only set repercussions for
not following peace agreements, but to
follow through with these consequences.
Otherwise, the current cycle of violence and
then negotiations, with the separatist leaders
welding the power, will continue to plague
the country.
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